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KOVACS v. COOPER

FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND REGULATION OF
SOUND AMPLIFICATION DEVICES
Kovacs v. Cooper'
An ordinance in the city of Trenton, New Jersey, made
it unlawful "to play, use or operate for advertising purposes, or for any other purpose whatsoever, on or upon
the public streets ... any device known as a sound truck,
loud speaker or sound amplifier . . . or any instrument of

any kind or character which emits therefrom loud and
raucous noises and is attached to and upon any vehicle
operated or standing upon said streets.. .". Defendant was

operating a sound truck, commenting on a labor dispute
in progress at the time in Trenton, when a policeman,
hearing the broadcasting, walked in the direction of the
sound until he found the truck on a public street. The
appellee, a police judge, convicted the defendant of violating the ordinance. On appeal from a judgment of the
New Jersey Court of Errors and Appeals affirming,2 in
an equally divided court and without a majority opinion,
the decision of the New Jersey Supreme Court which
upheld the conviction,3 the Supreme Court of the United
States, with four justices dissenting, affirmed. The precise
scope and effect of the decision in the Supreme Court and
the rationale of the holding cannot be stated definitely.
Justice Reed announced the judgment of the court and
handed down an opinion in which only Chief Justice Vinson
and Justice Burton joined, and which was based primarily
upon the assumption that the New Jersey Courts had
interpreted the ordinance as barring from the streets, not
all sound trucks, but only those which made loud and
raucous noises. Rejecting the contention that the words
"loud and raucous" set a standard so vague, obscure and
indefinite as to fall within the doctrine of the Winters case 4
the conclusion was reached that to regulate noise in this
manner is a valid exercise of the police power of a state;
that the "preferred position of freedom of speech ...

does

not require legislators to be insensible to claims by citizens
to comfort and convenience", as when sound devices are
objectionably amplified; that the right of free speech does
not include the right to force unwilling people to listen,
and sound devices amplified to such an extent have that
'336 U. S. 77, 69 S. Ct. 448 (1949).
'The dissents are printed. 135 N. J. L. 584, 52 A. 2d 806 (1947).
Kovacs v. Cooper, 135 N. J. L. 64, 50 A. 2d 451 (1046).
'Winters v. New York, 333 U. S. 507 (1948).
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effect. Martin v. City of Struthers,O which upheld the right
of a distributor to summon householders to the door to
receive his pamphlets, was distinguished because there the
home owner could protect himself by a "do not disturb"
sign and the distributor could not force him to take a
pamphlet or to listen even if he did come to the door.
Saia v. New York' was also distinguished on the ground
that the invalidation of the ordinance there was based
primarily on the absence of sufficient standards limiting
the exercise of discretion by an official empowered to grant
permits for the use of sound trucks.7
Justices Frankfurter and Jackson, each of whom had
dissented in the Saia case, filed separate opinions reaffirming the views which they had there expressed and concurring in the result in the instant case solely for the
reasons stated in their prior dissents. Both apparently feel
that "aural aggressions" are "implicit in the use of sound
trucks" and that it does not matter whether the ordinance
prohibits all sound trucks or only those "emitting loud and
raucous noises". Justice Jackson specifically disagrees with
Justice Reed as to the scope of the ordinance, regarding it
as an outright prohibition of all sound trucks.
Justice Murphy dissented separately without opinion.
Justice Black in a dissenting opinion, in which Justices
Douglas and Rutledge concurred, stated that the ordinance,
both on its face and as interpreted by the New Jersey
Courts, imposed an absolute prohibition on all use of
sound trucks in the streets of Trenton'; that the defendant
was charged only with operating a sound truck on the
public streets, not with operating one emitting loud and
raucous noises, and was convicted only of that charge upon
evidence showing nothing more; that in consequence, under
Justice Reed's opinion the defendant "will be punished for
an offense with which he was not charged,' to prove which
.319 U. S. 141 (1942).
0334 U. S. 558 (1948).

' See Note, Freedom o1 Speech and Regulatior of S'ound Amplifleation
Devices, 9 Md. L. Rev. 285, 286 (1948).
0 In interpreting the ordinance, the New Jersey Supreme Court, Kovacs
v. Cooper, 8upra, N. 3, at page 66, 50 A. 2d p. 452, (the Court of Errors
and Appeals affirmed without opinion) said it applies only to "(1) vehicles;
(2) containing an instrument in the nature of a sound amplifier or any
other instrument emitting loud and raucous noises". In another part of
the opinion the same Court said, "it prohibits the use upon the public
streets of any device known as a sound truck". Kovacs v. Cooper, supra,
N. 3, p. 69, 50 A. 2d at pp. 453-4.
1 The charge was that "he did on South Stockton Street... play, use and
operate a device known as a sound truck". See Justice Black's dissent in
the Instant case.
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no evidence was offered, 10 and of which he was not convicted", in itself a violation of due process of law.1 To
affirm a conviction under the ordinance as so interpreted
would constitute a repudiation of the Saia case, since sound
trucks were there placed on the same constitutional level
as other media of communication, and, although subject to
reasonable regulation as to time, place and volume, could
not be completely banned from the city streets consistently
with the holding in that case.
Justice Rutledge also dissenting, in a separate opinion,
points out the inconsistencies of the case and the impossibility of foretelling its effect, stating that whether or
not a state may completely bar sound trucks from public
places is still left open for future determination.
The net result of the decision and of the divergent
views presented is extraordinarily anomalous. It is specifically stated in Justice Rutledge's dissent that a majority
of the court (consisting of Justices Jackson, Black, Douglas,
Rutledge, and presumably either Justice Murphy or Justice
Frankfurter or both) agree that the ordinance, both on its
face and as interpreted by the New Jersey courts, prohibits
all sound trucks and not merely those emitting loud and
raucous noises. A different majority, made up of Justices
Black, Douglas, Rutledge, Reed and Burton and Chief
Justice Vinson," also agree or seem to agree that outright
prohibition of all sound trucks would be unconstitutional.
Only Justices Frankfurter and Jackson, the first inferentially and the second positively, regard an outright prohibition as valid. Should not the result then logically have
been that the ordinance involved was unconstitutional
and the conviction improper? Yet the result is just the
reverse, because of the combination of the minority of
three who construe the ordinance as not imposing an
absolute bar with the minority of two who believe an
absolute bar is valid. Curiously, a judgment of reversal
would have been equally anomalous, since it would have
set aside a conviction which a majority of the court,
10Quaere: Was the fact that the patrolman, after hearing the broadcasting, had to search for the truck in order to find it, evidence of the volume
of the sound?
U Cole v. Arkansas, 333 U. S. 196 (1948).
It should be noted that defendant was aware that "loud and raucous" had some Implication in his case
since be contended that these words were too vague and indefinite to be
sufficient as a standard for criminal prosecution. See the Reed opinion in
the Instant case.
" "Absolute prohibition . .. of all sound amplification ... Is. .. probably
unconstitutional ..

.".

See Justice Reed's opinion in the Instant case.
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though for different and inconsistent reasons, thought was
constitutionally correct. 18
As a guide to state and municipal authorities faced with
the practical task of dealing with the sound truck problem,
the decision is of little value and confuses rather than clarifies. There is unanimous agreement that some regulation
as to time, place and volume would be valid, but a majority
also agree that this is not the issue before the court. It is
difficult to say whether the Saia case is still law or whether
it is now repudiated; Justices Jackson, Black, Douglas and
Rutledge state that it is in effect repudiated; Justices Reed
and Burton, and Chief Justice Vinson believe that it is
distinguishable and still authority; Justice Frankfurter
agrees that it is distinguishable but insists that it should
be repudiated; and Justice Murphy dissents silently. On the
face of this analysis then, the Saia case may seem to be
overruled; yet with two new members on the court who
might well be inclined to agree with the reasoning of
Justices Reed and Burton and Chief Justice Vinson, it is
possible, perhaps even probable, that it is still authority
for the reasons given by Justice Reed. In addition to this,
in spite of the apparent agreement of at least six justices
that absolute prohibition of all sound trucks would be unconstitutional, the result actually is inconsistent with that
view, as stated above. Owing to the divided views of the
majority which affirmed the conviction, the question of
the validity of absolute prohibition is left unanswered.
Basically, we have here, as in the Saia case, a conflict
between freedom of speech for those wishing to use sound
trucks and freedom of thought for those wishing immunity
therefrom. 4 Since both are among the basic rights accorded
a preferred position by the Supreme Court in recent years,
it is not surprising that confusion should result when two
such rights conflict. In this connection, an interesting
feature of the case is Justice Frankfurter's rebellion in his
concurring opinion against the "preferred position" doctrine. To speak of "the preferred position of freedom of
speech" is, he contends, to use a "mischievous" phrase,
which "expresses a complicated process of constitutional
adjudication by a deceptive formula" making for "mechanical jurisprudence." He traces chronologically the evolution
of the doctrine and argues that there is no justification in
the cases in which the phrase originated for any principle
11For a similarly curious anomalous result, cf. Hoover and Allison Co. v.
Evatt, 325 U. S. 892 (1945).
1, See the close of Justice Frankfurter's separate concurring opinion.
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that legislation restricting the exercise of rights embraced
in the First Amendment should be regarded as presumptively invalid. What is really behind the notion sought to
be expressed by this phrase, he states, is merely that the
courts should feel more free than in other cases to find
legislation unconstitutional where "free inquiry" is involved, since it is this which assures us of an "open
society as against a closed one"; while they should be less
willing to oppose their opinions to those of legislatures
in the economic area which is one of changing and debatable
views. Furthermore, he reasons, all means of communication are not given the same constitutional rights as the
unaided human voice, but raise new problems which were
not contemplated by the draftsmen of the Constitution and
which can be left to the legislative judgment for solution.
In the instant case one of the problems raised is that by
the use of sound trucks unwilling people can be forced to
listen, thus making further inroads on the "steadily narrowing opportunities for serenity and reflection" which
are necessary to freedom of thought; "and without freedom
of thought there can be no free society".

FURTHER ON WHETHER A SPENDTHRIFT TRUST
MAY BE REACHED FOR ALIMONY OR SUPPORT
Safe Deposit & Trust Co. of Baltimore v. Robertson1
Appellee, wife, obtained a divorce a vinculo from her
husband in the Circuit Court of Baltimore City. The decree ordered the husband to pay a certain sum as permanent
alimony, subject to the further order of the Court. Subsequently, the husband took up residence in New York and
allowed the alimony payments to fall in arrears. Appellee
obtained an order reducing to judgment the arrears in
the amount of $4,229 and laid an attachment for this
amount in the hands of the garnishee-appellant, who filed
a motion to quash, reciting that the only assets in its hands
consisted of accrued income payable to the husband under
valid spendthrift trusts. The Chancellor overruled the
motion to quash, and signed an order directing the garnishee to bring into court all the funds due the judgment
debtor, and pay the same to him in open court on a certain
day, the husband being notified by registered mail to appear
165 A. 2d 292 (Md. 1949).

